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Municipal Fiber in the United States: A Financial Assessment 
Christopher S. Yoo,* Jesse Lambert,† and Timothy P. Pfenninger‡ 
Abstract 
Despite growing interest in broadband provided by municipally owned and 
operated fiber-to-the-home networks, the academic literature has yet to undertake 
a systematic assessment of these projects’ financial performance.  To fill this gap, 
we utilize municipalities’ official reports to offer an empirical evaluation of the 
financial performance of every municipal fiber project in the U.S. operating in 
2010 through 2019.  An analysis of the actual performance of the resulting 
fifteen-project panel dataset reveals that none of the projects generated sufficient 
nominal cash flow in the short run to maintain solvency without infusions of 
additional cash from outside sources or debt relief.  Similarly, 87% have not 
actually generated sufficient nominal cash flow to put them on track to achieve 
long-run solvency.  In addition, 73% generated negative nominal cash flow over 
the past three fiscal years, leaving them poorly positioned to make up their 
deficits and causing them to fall farther into debt.  An assessment based on the net 
present value of these projects’ operating cash flow indicates that 53% of projects 
would not be on track to breakeven even assuming the theoretical best-case 
performance in terms of capital expenditures and debt service.  Close analysis of 
these projects’ performance reveals that revenue generation likely plays a more 
important role in generating cash flow than efficiency in construction costs or 
operating efficiency. 
1 Introduction 
 Municipal fiber networks have long been a hot topic.  High profile projects (such as the 
one in Chattanooga, Tennessee), the need for Internet connectivity during the COVID-19 
pandemic, and the inclusion of public funding for state and local governments to improve 
broadband in the Biden Administration’s proposed infrastructure legislation have heightened 
interest in municipal fiber’s potential role in closing the digital divide.  The November 2020 
election illustrated the public divide on the topic, as some U.S. cities approved ballot initiatives 
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seeking authorization to proceed with municipal broadband projects, while other cities rejected 
them.1 
 States and cities evaluating whether to fund such projects would benefit from empirical 
analyses of the success and failure of past efforts.  To date, the literature has drawn mixed 
conclusions on whether municipal fiber promotes economic growth (Holt and Jamison, 2009; 
Kenny and Kenny, 2011; Guidry, Carson and Haon, 2012; Oh, 2019; Ford and Seals, 2019) or 
improves price and service quality (Talbot, Hessekiel, and Kehl, 2017; Chao and Park, 2020; 
Ford, 2020).  A more fundamental limitation of these analyses is that benefits only represent half 
of the equation:  The other side of any cost-benefit analysis requires considering whether 
municipal fiber projects are likely to be self-sustaining or whether they are likely to generate 
deficits that cities will have to cover with funds from general tax revenue.  Such support may 
require either one-time subsidies for capital construction or ongoing annual support for projects 
that continue to generate annual cash flow deficits.  Cities weighing the tradeoff between funding 
municipal fiber projects or other potential priorities need the clearest possible picture of the 
financial risks that they face. 
 This article is the first to take a more systematic approach using a unique dataset 
comprised of the lifetime financial performance of every municipal fiber project in the U.S. that 
was in operation as of 2011 and provided annual reports of their fiber operations.  It represents 
the only analysis to date that evaluates all of these projects’ financial performance based on the 
highest quality data issued by government sources and employs the measures generally accepted 
by the financial community for evaluating viability. 
 
1 Voters in Denver, Berthoud, and Englewood, Colorado, authorized their cities to opt out of a state law 
prohibiting municipal broadband.  Voters in Kaysville, Utah, and Lucas, Texas, rejected municipal fiber projects 
(Gonsalves, 2020). 
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2 Literature review 
 The academic study of government-owned telecommunications networks began with the 
debate surrounding the 1912 nationalization of the British telephone system (e.g., Holcombe, 
1911).  The UK government’s acquisition of British Telecom touched off a wave of 
nationalization that led to nearly universal public ownership by the 1970s, with the United States 
being the notable exception (Noll, 2000).2  The 1984 denationalization of British Telecom led to 
a global privatization movement that sparked further study of whether private ownership 
improved these firms’ financial performance and service quality (e.g., Bortolotti et al., 2002).  
Municipal Wi-Fi enjoyed a brief paroxysm of support during the mid-2000s, which generated 
another wave of scholarship (e.g., Jassem, 2010). 
 Commentary and popular attention have increasingly focused on municipal fiber.  To 
date, empirical analyses of these networks’ financial performance have rarely been published in 
scholarly journals and have employed somewhat narrow methodologies that employ short-term 
snapshots and focus on operating income, which is not the preferred basis for assessing viability, 
as discussed below (compare Scott and Wellings, 2005; with Lenard, 2004; Balhoff and Rowe, 
2005; Davidson and Santorelli, 2014).  The only academic publication that focuses on financial 
returns is Beard et al. (2020, 46–51), which examines five years of operating income for a single 
project.  No prior scholarly work has systematically assessed the entire universe of U.S. 
municipal fiber projects, evaluated projects over their entire lifetime, nor focused on cash flow 
instead of income.  The closest is an earlier, unpublished version of this study, which analyzed 
five years of cash flow for twenty projects (Yoo and Pfenninger, 2017a).3 
 
2 Even the U.S. experimented with government ownership during World War I (Janson and Yoo, 2013). 
3 For our responses to some initial reactions to our report, see Yoo and Pfenninger (2017b). 
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3 Bonds as the Principal Mechanism for Financing Municipal Fiber Projects 
 Municipal fiber networks require significant upfront investments requiring tens of 
millions of dollars.  Because cities rarely have that amount of cash on hand, they typically 
finance such projects by issuing tax-free municipal bonds, which allow them to borrow the cash 
needed for initial construction and then repay the principal and interest from the returns 
generated over the lifespan of the project, with the expected life of fiber optic cables to be twenty 
to twenty-five years and the expected life of digital switching equipment to be between twelve 
and eighteen years (U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 2000, Appendix B).4  Because 
municipal fiber projects require an initial construction period during which they do not generate 
significant revenue, the debt instruments financing these projects typically permit interest-only 
payments during a project’s initial three-to-five years to give it time to ramp up.  Thereafter, 
payments must cover a portion of the principal in addition to the accrued interest. 
 The bond documents for the municipal fiber projects included in this study consistently 
reflect the expectation that the projects would generate sufficient returns to service this debt.  
First, all of the bonds that provided the initial funding for these projects were issued as “revenue 
bonds,” which are defined as bonds expected to be repaid from funds generated by a specific 
project or source, as opposed to “general obligation bonds,” which are expected to be repaid 
from the city’s sources of general tax revenue, such as property taxes (U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 2021).5  For example, Monticello characterized its initial 2008 financing 
 
4 The U.S. Internal Revenue Service (2020, 106) similarly places the depreciable life of distribution plant at 
twenty-four years and computer-based switching equipment at 9.5 years for telephone companies.  The U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (2012) similarly estimates that the useful life of fiber cables to be between 
twenty to twenty-five years.  The bonds used to finance the vast majority of municipal fiber projects have terms of 
between twenty and twenty-five years. 
5 This terminology does not apply projects financed through means other than bonds, such as leases 
(Burlington) and certificates of participating (Salisbury and Wilson). 
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as “Telecommunications Revenue Bonds” and specified that they were payable “solely from the 
net revenues of the FTTP project.”  After it defaulted on the 2008 debt, it characterized the new 
2014 debt issued to finance the settlement as “General Obligation Bonds.” 
 Second, the official statements accompanying the initial debt issues, which contain the 
information that the SEC requires municipal bond issuers to disclose, consistently note that the 
debt is expected to be repaid out of revenues generated by the municipal fiber project.   
 Third, the bond instruments used to provide the initial financing for the projects included 
in this study omitted provisions requiring annual contributions from the cities to cover expected 
shortfalls.  Debt instruments for projects expected to require contributions from general funds 
invariably include terms specifying the schedule of payments that cities are expected to make 
from general revenue into reserve funds.  No such terms appeared in the projects included in this 
study. 
 Fourth, the annual financial reports of all of the cities in this study initially classified their 
municipal fiber projects as enterprise funds or independent authorities rather than governmental 
or internal service funds.  According to Governmental Accounting Standards Board Statement 
No. 9 (1989), this signifies the expectation that these projects will repay their costs from project 
revenue and not from taxes or interfund transfers.   
 Fifth, many annual financial reports state that the cities expected these projects to cover 
their costs out of project revenue and that the financing plans do not require cities to make 
regular contributions from their tax revenue to defray project costs. 
 None of these features would have been true had the cities that initiated projects expected 
the projects not to be self-sustaining and would require contributions from general revenue.  All 
indications—the characterization of the bonds as revenue bonds, the language of the official 
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statements, the lack of provisions requiring contributions from general funds, the way these cities 
accounted for their municipal fiber operations, and numerous representations in these cities’ 
annual financial reports—indicate that the cities initiating these projects did not expect them to 
generate shortfalls and instead expected them to cover their costs.  In many cases, the projects 
were promoted as potential sources of surplus revenue.   
 In any event, every city initiating a municipal fiber project would benefit from an 
evidence-based understanding of previous projects’ financial performance to help them assess 
the likelihood their project will require support from general tax revenue or other sources and the 
potential magnitude of that support.  Regardless of the collateral benefits a municipal fiber 
project may create, cities must still pay the principal and interest associated with the debt 
incurred to build out these networks.  Indeed, municipalities that initiate projects that are unable 
to cover their costs of debt and operations will have to make up the shortfall from general tax 
revenues or to default on their debt, either of which would inevitably affect the cost of financing 
all of the city’s operations, not just the municipal fiber project. 
4 Methodology and data 
 The approach of this analysis is to assess municipal fiber projects’ viability in both the 
short- and long-run.  Short-run viability measures the extent to which municipal fiber projects 
have been able to cover their costs to date.  Those that have been unable to do so necessarily had 
to rely on additional contributions from other sources.  Long-run viability assesses the likelihood 
that a project will break even by the maturity date of its initial debt financing. 
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4.1 Cash flow as the basis for assessing viability 
 Financial analysts generally regard cash flow as the preferred basis for assessing a 
project’s financial viability.  This is because the availability of cash is what determines whether 
an enterprise can meet its obligations.  Although existing studies and press accounts tend to focus 
on operating income, many profitable enterprises become insolvent because so much of their 
cash is tied up in illiquid assets that are not available to pay incoming bills. 
 Consider the capital costs needed to build a fiber network.  From a cash flow perspective, 
projects typically require a large cash outlay during their initial years and require less capital 
during their later years, as discussed above.  Operating income distorts the impact of this large 
initial cash expenditure by amortizing these capital costs across the projects’ expected lifespan as 
depreciation expense.  The result is that the income statement radically understates the cash 
demands during a municipal fiber project’s early years and overstates the demand on cash in 
later years.  Factors like these cause net income to provide an incomplete reflection of an 
enterprise’s cash needs, which is why Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 95 
(1987) began requiring that every financial report must also include a statement of cash flow in 
addition to a balance sheet and income statement.  It is also why financial analysts evaluate 
projects’ likely solvency based on cash flow forecasts rather than profitability (e.g., Beaver, 
1966).   
4.1.1 Actual performance:  Nominal cash flow (“NCF”) 
 Nominal cash flow (“NCF”), which measures the actual cash flowing into and out of a 
project, is the best measure of a project’s viability.  Our NCF analysis considers the first two 
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components from Statement No. 9 of the Government Accounting Standards Board’s four 
required components of cash flow statements:6 
 Cash flow from operating activities (sometimes called cash flow from operations 
(“CFO”)) represents operating revenue less operating expenses, excluding expenses 
that do not require an expenditure of cash, such as depreciation, plus changes in key 
categories of working capital associated with operations.   
 Cash flow from capital expenditures and debt service (sometimes called cash flow 
from financing activities (“CFFA”)) represents cash used to purchase capital assets 
associated with the project (typically the property, plant, and equipment needed to 
build the fiber network), proceeds from new capital debt financing, payments of 
capital debt principal and interest due; and other long-term financing. 
 NCF can be used to evaluate a project’s viability in both the short- and long-run.  In the 
short-run, a project’s NCF should be sufficient to cover its obligations during every year of its 
operations, with the expectation being that the debt proceeds will provide sufficient cash to cover 
network construction costs in the initial years of operations before a project has the chance to 
become profitable in later years.7  If a project is unable to meet its cash obligations and requires 
an infusion of additional cash from outside sources, it will have a negative cumulative NCF, 
where cumulative NCF is the summation of NCF to date.  Put another way, a project that is not 
viable in the short run will have negative cumulative NCF. 
 Cumulative NCF can also be used to evaluate long-run solvency by measuring whether a 
project is on track to generate sufficient cash by the maturity date of its initial debt to retire it.  
More specifically, we look at each project’s cumulative NCF as of 2019 and the amount it 
generated in the last three fiscal years for which we have complete data (2017, 2018, and 2019) 
to estimate whether it is on track to pay back its debt by the maturity date of its initial debt.  
 
6 The analysis omits the latter two components, “Cash flow from noncapital financing activities” and “Cash 
flow from investing activities,” as both are, by definition, peripheral to a projects’ operations. 
7 Accordingly, and as mentioned above, most debt instruments permit interest-only payments during a 
project’s initial three-to-five years without requiring any principal repayment to give it time to ramp up.  Thereafter, 
operations are supposed to generate sufficient cash to cover the principal and interest due.   
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Because we are trying to evaluate the project’s expectations at the time the city initiated its fiber 
project, we set the project end date as the maturity date of the initial debt, as this is the date by 
which those initiating the project are expected to be able to pay off all of the principal and 
interest needed to finance the project.  
 To enable comparison across the municipal fiber projects, we had to make several 
adjustments to CFFA to standardize the treatment of NCF.  First, the vast majority of cities in 
this study transferred funds from other internal sources (such as loans from other funds or 
transfers of tax revenue from general funds) to cover cash flow shortfalls.  Some of these cities 
treated these transfers as capital funding and included it in CFFA, which artificially inflated their 
NCF, while others treated them as noncapital funding that was not included in CFFA, which had 
no effect on NCF.  For this analysis, we have excluded from CFFA transfers from internal 
sources because these projects are supposed to be self-supporting. 
 Second, CFFA varies based on decisions on how to account for these projects that have 
nothing to do with financial performance.  For example, a large majority carried the debt used to 
finance these projects on the books of their broadband divisions, while a minority opted to carry 
them in whole or in part on the books of their electric power divisions.  In addition, some cities 
refinanced or defaulted on their debt for reasons that arose after the project’s initiation.  For this 
analysis, we have adjusted CFFA such that we treat all projects as if their debt were carried on 
the books of their broadband divisions under their initial debt without any defaults or 
refinancing. 
 The combination of these adjustments yields the following formula for Adjusted NCF, 
which allows these projects to be compared on an equal basis by excluding the impact of 
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decisions regarding whether to make internal transfers or to refinance or default on the initial 
debt: 
Adjusted NCF (“ANCF”) = CFO + CFFA + adjustment for internal transfers 
included in CFFA + adjustment for differences in debt financing  
 
 Illustrations of the expected pattern of NCF are depicted in Table 1 and Figure 1, which 
are based on the Forecasted Statement of Operations included in Appendix F to the official 
statement for the 2008 Bond issued to finance the fiber project in Monticello, Minnesota.  For the 
sake of clarity, this example is based on Monticello’s projected performance, not its actual 
performance.8 
 
8 In these projections, adjusted NCF is the same as NCF because the projections necessarily do not include 
any unexpected deviations that projects unexpectedly deployed that were not originally envisioned by the plan (e.g., 
transfers, refinancing). 
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Table 1:   
Projected annual and cumulative NCF for Monticello, 2008–2015 
 2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  
Cash flow from operating activities (468,885) (2,016,902) (549,531) 436,569  879,246  1,586,317  1,918,825  2,213,870  
Additions to broadband plant (10,961,191) (3,575,820) (2,363,979) (726,031) (624,904) (1,265,741) (434,799) (404,149) 
Net cash provided by financing activities 25,094,060  0 0 0 0 (70,000) (220,000) (380,000) 
NCF 13,663,984  (5,592,722) (2,913,510) (289,462) 254,342  250,576  1,264,026  1,429,721  























Annual NCF Cumulative NCF
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 The forecast projects positive NCF in year one because of the bond proceeds, negative 
NCF during years two through four due to the slow startup of operations and the early capital 
required to build the network, and increasingly positive NCF starting in year five.  Regarding 
short-run solvency, the bond proceeds are forecast to be large enough to ensure that cumulative 
NCF remains positive even during the initial years of NCF deficits.  After year four, the project 
is expected to generate positive annual NCF that is sufficiently large to allow the project to cover 
its obligations during every year of operations and to pay off its debt when it matures.  As we 
shall see, Monticello fell far short of its projected +$8.1 million cumulative NCF surplus, instead 
generating a ($4.7 million) deficit.   
4.1.2 Theoretical performance:  Net present value (“NPV”) of cash flow from operations 
(“CFO”) 
 Another common approach to estimating the value of a project is capitalizing its income.  
One standard way of doing so is calculating the project’s net present value (“NPV”) by summing 
the project’s annual CFO, discounted by the project’s weighted average cost of capital 
(“WACC”), and subtracting its overall project cost.  This approach sets aside any shortcomings 
in the actual approach employed to finance the project and focuses exclusively on the strength or 
weakness of a project’s operating performance.  In many ways, this analysis represents a best-
case scenario based on the assumption that the project made the optimal decisions regarding 
capital expenditure and debt financing. 
 If NPV is greater than or equal to zero as of 2019, the project has already broken even 
and will remain viable so long as CFO does not turn negative in the future.  If NPV is negative as 
of 2019, the deficit can be divided by the years remaining until maturity of the initial debt to 
determine the annual discounted CFO needed for the project to break even.  This can be 
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compared to the project’s average annual discounted CFO in recent years to assess whether the 
project’s recent performance is sufficient to make up that shortfall by the maturity date.  As with 
the cumulative NCF approach to evaluating long-term solvency, we use each project’s 
performance over the past three fiscal years (2017, 2018, and 2019) to measure its ability to 
make up any shortfalls without additional contributions from general revenues. 
 Sample forecasts are presented in Table 2 and Figure 2, which like Table 1 and Figure 1 
are based on Appendix F of the official statement accompanying the 2008 Bond issued to finance 
the fiber project in Monticello, Minnesota.  As before, this illustration is based on Monticello’s 
projected performance, not its actual performance. 
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Table 2:   
Projected annual and cumulative discounted CFO for Monticello, 2008–2015 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Project cost (26,445,000)        
CFO (468,885) (2,016,902) (549,531) 436,569  879,246  1,586,317  1,918,825  2,213,870  
Discounted CFO  (468,885) (1,890,609) (482,866) 359,587  678,857  1,148,087  1,301,779  1,407,898  
NPV (26,913,885) (28,804,494) (29,287,360) (28,927,773) (28,248,916) (27,100,828) (25,799,049) (24,391,152) 
 
 




















Annual discounted CFOA NPV
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 This forecast projects an NPV of ($24.4 million) after the project’s first eight years,  
reaching an annual discounted CFO of +$1.4 million in 2015.  To generate positive NPV by the 
initial bond maturity date of 2031, this project would have to generate an average annual 
discounted CFO of +$1.5 million over the sixteen years from 2016 to 2031, inclusive.  This 
projection implicitly requires discounted CFO to grow at an annual growth rate of +0.5% over 
that time in order to reach positive NPV and break even, which seems quite reasonable.  The 
analysis that follows reveals that Monticello’s actual performance did not meet its forecast, 
generating an NPV that was ($7.7 million) below its forecast.   
4.2 The data 
 The creation of the novel dataset underlying this analysis began with a systematic effort 
to identify every municipal fiber project in the U.S. that received its initial financing in, or 
before, fiscal year 2011.  The issuance of the initial debt was used as the starting date for each of 
these projects because that is the date from which the projects began accruing interest that must 
be paid regardless of when the networks began generating revenue.  Tracking data through fiscal 
year 2019 provided at least ten years of data for all projects that are still operating and provides 
complete data for projects that have already terminated operations.  Ending the analysis before 
fiscal year 2020 effectively avoids having to take the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic into 
account. 
 The principal resource for identifying municipal fiber projects is Appendix 1 of the 
Executive Office of the President’s January 2015 report on Community-Based Broadband 
Solutions, which provides a comprehensive list of municipal broadband networks and identifies 
the technology each one uses.  We augmented this list by consulting other industry and scholarly 
resources that list municipal fiber projects (e.g., Fiber-to-the-Home Council, 2009; Montagne 
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and Chaillou, 2010; Mitchell, 2012).  Review of these lists identified eighty-eight municipal fiber 
projects operating in fiscal year 2011.   
 We then examined the annual financial reports for these projects to determine how many 
provided separate reports for their fiber operations.9  A review of the annual financial reports 
identified fifteen projects operating in 2011 that provided complete reports of their fiber 
operations from project initiation through fiscal year 2019 or project termination.  Basic data 
about these projects appear in Table 3, including debt information, housing units, median 
household income, and population density.    
 
9 The annual reports were obtained from Bloomberg’s Data Transparency feature, the Electronic Municipal 
Market Access Service (“EMMA”) of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC’s”) Municipal Securities 
Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”), public postings to the Internet, and direct requests for information. 
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Table 4:   






















Jackson, TN 2004 22 54,300,000 67,187 25,925 46,112 1,152 
Provo, UT 2004 22 39,500,000 116,616 34,454 53,864 2,799 
Windom, MN 2004 20  12,690,000 4,428 1,999 44,991 1,094 
UTOPIA, UT 2005 22 185,000,000 474.442 148,226 70,908  2,925 
Burlington, VT 2005 20 33,500,000 42,545 16,552 51,394 4,128 
Morristown, TN 2005 25 19,500,000 29,782 11,639 32,193 1,089 
Pulaski, TN 2006 19 8,500,000 7,643 3,189 31,519 1,018 
Clarksville, TN 2007 25  41,675,000* 58.985 58,985 51,281 1,601 
Wilson, NC 2007 26 31,800,000 49,272 19,667 42,036 1,584 
Lafayette, LA 2007 24  125,000,000 126,199 52,267 51,477 2,274 
Tullahoma, TN 2008 20 16,975,000 19,852 8,079 48,770 847 
Chattanooga, TN 2008 25 280,600,000* 264,553 185,000  48,508 1,391 
Monticello, MN 2008 23 26,445,000 13,583 4,984 65,398 1,552 
Salisbury, NC 2009 21 35,865,000 33,727 12,524 41,901 1,513 
Dunnellon, FL 2011 15 5,500,000 2,057 1,043 33,197 328 
Low 2004 15 5,500,000 2,057 1,043 31,519 295 
High 2011 26 185,000,000 474,442 185,000 70,465 4,119 
Median 2007 22 31,800,000 41,500 16,552 48,770 1,528 
Mean 2007 22 45,736,538 51,865 38,969 47,570 1,686 
* Project financed by electric power division. 
 
 The total amount financed and WACC are derived from the text and the coupon rates for 
the actual debt instruments or from the official statements that SEC rules require municipal bond 
issuers to provide to underwriters.10  For projects that used multiple rounds of funding to finance 
 
10 The official statements were obtained from EMMA, Bloomberg, and public postings to the Internet.  For 
two projects (Burlington and Dunnellon), the information was derived from the actual loan agreements, which were 
submitted during litigation over the default on the debt.  Debt instruments that included financing for both fiber and 
nonfiber projects (Chattanooga, Clarksville, Morristown, and Wilson) were allocated across the projects per the 
infrastructure expenditures reflected in the official statements.  All demographic data are taken from the U.S. 
Census.  Regarding the multicity projects, housing units for the Utah Open Infrastructure Agency (“UTOPIA”) 
represent the total households in all of the pledging cities, and the median household income is for the median of the 
pledging cities.  Housing units for Chattanooga represent the total electric households served by the EPB, and 
median household income is for the Chattanooga Metropolitan Statistical Area. 
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principal construction, the project cost represents the total capital raised by the multiple rounds.11  
We made adjustments to the total amount financed so that we could compare all of the projects 
as if they were financed as stand-alone broadband projects.  This means that the total amount 
financed omits any subsidies provided by state governments or the federal government.  For 
example, the total amount financed does not include Chattanooga’s stimulus funding of $111.6 
million or UTOPIA’s funding of $16.2 million.  We also made adjustments where the projects 
were financed as smart grid projects; Chattanooga and Clarksville were financed as such, 
meaning that the network construction costs and corresponding debt service (i.e., capital costs) 
were carried by the electric power divisions of these independent authorities instead of their 
broadband divisions, which paid periodic use charges to the electric power divisions 
proportionate to their actual network usage (i.e., operating expenses).  Converting these capital 
expenses into pay-as-you-go operating expenses allowed these projects to shift the capital risk 
associated with these networks to their electric power operations.   
 Interestingly, all of these projects are located in areas that satisfy the U.S. Census 
definition of urban, and only one falls below the standard used by the U.S. Department of 
Agricultural Economic Research Service that defines rural areas as those with a population 
density of less than 500 persons per square mile.  Also notable is the fact that each of these 
projects was an overbuild of areas already receiving broadband service from one or more private 
providers.  None was a greenfield project designed to provide service to residences who could 
not previously access broadband. 
 
11 These projects include Burlington, Lafayette, Morristown, UTOPIA, and Windom. 
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 To assess the representativeness of this sample, we compared the basic demographic data 
of these projects with those of the overall universe of municipal fiber projects.  The results are 
summarized in Table 4, and the full results are reported in Online Appendix A.   
Table 4:   










Median – study cities 41,500 16,096 47,310 1,452 
Median– all municipal fiber cities 13,583 8,079 50,591 1,190 
Mean – study cities 97,678 35,290 47,297 1,512 
Mean – all municipal fiber cities 49,329 18,392 50,647 1,430 
 
 The projects included in this study tended to be considerably larger than the typical city 
supporting a municipal fiber project.  This is unsurprising, given that larger projects are more 
likely to be able to support the expense of providing separate reports of the financial 
performance of their fiber operations.  They are also denser and have a lower median household 
income than the overall universe of municipal fiber projects.  The larger size and higher 
population density make the study sample to be slightly biased toward more successful projects 
than the overall universe of municipal fiber projects, mitigated slightly by the small difference in 
median household income. 
5 Results 
 We now apply the NCF and NPV analysis described above to these fifteen projects.  Full 
details are available in Online Appendix B.  
 
20 
5.1 Actual performance:  Adjusted nominal cash flow (“ANCF”) 
 The results of our cumulative ANCF analysis are summarized in Table 5.  The second 
column assesses short-run solvency by examining the lowest cumulative ANCF during each 
project’s life.  If this number is negative, the project has not generated sufficient cash flow to 
cover its costs in at least one year and has required infusions of additional cash from outside 
sources to remain solvent.   
 The other columns assess long-run solvency.  The third column reports each project’s 
cumulative ANCF as of 2019 to determine if it is currently running a deficit or surplus.  The 
fourth column reports the ANCF each project has generated over the past three fiscal years 
(2017, 2018, and 2019).  The fifth column uses the recent returns reported in the fourth column 
to project how many years each project would need to make up for any deficits reported in the 
third column.  The sixth column, which reports the number of years until the maturity date of the 
initial debt, can be compared with the fifth column to determine whether a project is on track to 
repay its debt.  The seventh column measures how much each project’s annual ANCF must 
improve in order to break even by subtracting its recent actual performance (reported in the 
fourth column) from the cumulative ANCF as of 2019 (second) divided by the number of years 
to initial debt maturity (sixth). 
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Table 5:   







ANCF as of 
2019 
Average 
annual ANCF,  
2017–19 
Years to 






Chattanooga, TN (24,164,960) 68,578,465  22,742,128 0 15 
Wilson, NC (7,544,971) (4,672,373) 731,218 6 14 
Clarksville, TN (28,536,619) (23,218,789) 1,275,398 18 14 
Lafayette, LA (46,769,435) (44,625,525) 714,637 62 13 
Windom, MN (2,376,777) (1,988,432) 19,761 101 6 
Jackson, TN (6,857,654) 1,561,170  (1,002,459) never 7 
Tullahoma, TN (194,672) (194,672) (533,779) never 9 
Pulaski, TN (3,317,057) (3,317,057) (453,755) never 6 
Morristown, TN (14,579,821) (14,579,821) (874,204) never 11 
Monticello, MN (16,732,246) (16,732,246) (1,768,214) never 12 
Salisbury, NC (24,455,847) (24,455,847) (3,209,227) never 10 
UTOPIA, UT (159,270,166) (159,270,166) (14,431,235) never 8 
Dunnellon, FL (8,643,210) (8,643,210) n/a never 7 
Provo, UT (11,126,580) (9,765,585) n/a never 7 
Burlington, VT (32,059,526) (32,059,526) n/a never 9 
 
 In terms of actual performance, none of the fifteen projects satisfied the short-run test for 
viability based on ANCF by generating cumulative ANCF surpluses every year of their 
operation.  That means that all the projects either required infusions of cash from outside sources 
or debt relief through refinancing.  The size of the peak cumulative ANCF deficits ranged from 
($0.2 million) to ($159.3 million), with the median peak deficit running ($14.6 million), and the 
average peak deficit running ($25.80 million).  To date, Tullahoma’s short-run deficit is fairly 
small, although recent returns suggest that it will widen unless its financial performance 
substantially improves. 
 In terms of long-run viability, only two projects (13%) have generated sufficient 
cumulative ANCF to be on track to cover their initial debt by before it is scheduled to mature :  
Chattanooga has already broken even, and Wilson would break even in six years if it is able to 
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maintain the level of performance it has achieved over the past three years, which would be swell 
before the maturity date of its initial debt in fourteen years.  Of the remaining thirteen projects 
(87%), only three generated positive cumulative ANCF over the last three fiscal years 
(Clarksville, Lafayette, and Wilson), although at too low a level to break even by the maturity 
date of their initial debt, although Clarksville is close.  The remaining ten projects (67%) either 
generated negative ANCF over the last three fiscal years or had already been sold at a significant 
loss.  Note that Jackson ran a small cumulative ANCF surplus through 2019, but its negative 
ANCF over the past three fiscal years indicate that the surplus will turn into a deficit in roughly a 
year and a half unless it substantially improves the fiscal performance of its operations.   
 Somewhat surprisingly, ten of the fifteen projects (67%) have either generated negative 
cumulative ANCF over the past three fiscal years (2017, 2018, and 2019) or have already ceased 
operations at a loss.  Projects that generate negative cumulative and annual ANCF have no 
chance of repaying their debt and, even worse, risk sinking further into debt with every year they 
continue to operate.   
5.2 Theoretical performance:  Net present value (“NPV”) of discounted cash flow from 
operations (“CFO”) 
 The NPV analysis of these projects’ discounted CFO yields slightly different results, 
which are reported in Table 6.  The second column reports the project financing, adjusted as 
described in Section 3.2 above.  The third column reports the cumulative discounted CFO from 
the initiation of the project through fiscal year 2019.  The fourth column reports the projects’ 
NPV, calculated by subtracting the cumulative discounted CFO (third column) from the initial 
project financing (second column).  The fifth column reports the average annual discounted CFO 
each project has generated over the past three fiscal years (2017, 2018, and 2019).  The sixth 
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column uses the recent returns (fifth column) to project how many years each project would need 
to make up for any deficits (fourth column).  The seventh column reports the number of years 
until the maturity date of the initial debt, which can be compared to the sixth column to 
determine whether a project is on track to repay its debt.  The eighth column calculates how 
much each project’s annual discounted CFO must improve in order to break even by subtracting 
its recent actual performance reported (fifth column) from the NPV as of 2019 (fourth column) 
by the number of years to initial debt maturity (seventh column). 
Table 6:   







CFO as of 
2019 













Jackson, TN 54,300,000  76,617,231  22,317,231  5,687,460  0  7 
Chattanooga, TN 280,600,000  228,523,244  (52,076,756) 27,952,186  2  15 
Wilson, NC 29,190,000  22,234,399  (6,955,601) 2,756,778  3  14 
Morristown, TN 19,500,000  12,604,555  (6,895,445) 1,597,193  4  11 
Lafayette, LA 125,000,000  71,568,919  (53,431,081) 10,402,161  5  13 
Tullahoma, TN 16,975,000  10,473,169  (6,501,831) 1,079,637  6  9 
Clarksville, TN 41,675,000  6,145,754  (35,529,246) 2,601,301  14  14 
Pulaski, TN 8,500,000  3,999,274  (4,500,726) 383,430  12  6 
Windom, MN 12,690,000  4,382,488  (8,307,512) 418,371  20  6 
Salisbury, NC 35,865,000  (795,753) (36,660,753) 103,269  355  10 
Monticello, MN 26,445,000  (5,895,812) (32,340,812) 1,965  16,461  12 
UTOPIA, UT 85,000,000  (17,538,964) (102,538,964) (59,648) never 8 
Dunnellon, FL 7,350,000  (3,408,484) (10,758,484) n/a n/a 7 
Burlington, VT 33,500,000  3,399,230  (30,100,770) n/a n/a 9 
Provo, UT 39,500,000  2,118,521  (37,381,479) n/a n/a 7 
* Project financed entirely by the electric power division and/or grants. 
 More than half of the fifteen projects (53%) are not on track to generate a positive NPV, 
and thus breakeven, by the maturity date of their initial debt financing.  Of these, three projects 
(20%) have already ceased operations and thus no longer have any opportunity to make up their 
deficits.  One project (7%) generated negative CFO and fell even further behind in recent years 
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(UTOPIA). The remaining seven projects (47%) generated positive discounted CFO but will 
have to improve their operations substantially in order to break-even.   
 Of the seven projects (47%) that are on track to break-even under NPV, one project (7%), 
Jackson, has already generated positive NPV and continued to generate positive discounted CFO 
over the past three fiscal years.  The remaining six projects (40%) should generate positive NPV 
well before the maturity dates of their initial debt.  Notably, two of the projects with the largest 
deficits as of 2019, Lafayette at ($53.4 million) and Chattanooga at ($52.1 million), generated 
sufficient discounted CFO in recent years to put them on track to break even in just a few years. 
5.3 Synthesis of the three approaches to analyzing viability 
 Combining the three approaches to analyzing cash flow provides a robust assessment of 
these projects’ viability, with the results summarized in Table 7.   
Table 7:   
Synthesis of the two approaches to analyzing cash flow 
Project Actual performance:  
short-run viability 
Actual performance:  
long-run viability 
Theoretical 
performance:   
long-run viability 
Chattanooga, TN  X X 
Wilson, NC  X X 
Clarksville, TN   X 
Jackson, TN   X 
Lafayette, LA   X 
Morristown, TN   X 
Tullahoma, TN   X 
Pulaski, TN    
Salisbury, NC    
UTOPIA, UT    
Windom, MN    
Monticello, MN    
Burlington, VT    
Dunnellon, FL    




 None of the fifteen projects satisfied the test for short-run viability and did not require 
infusions of cash from other sources.  In terms of long-run viability, only two projects (14%) 
satisfied the tests based on both actual and theoretical performance:  Chattanooga and Wilson.  
Five additional projects (33%) failed the long-run test based on actual performance but passed 
the test based on theoretical performance.  Eight projects (53%) failed both the tests of long-run 
viability based on actual and theoretical performance.   
5.4 Internal details of project performance 
 Closer analysis of the internal details of these fifteen projects’ financial performance 
provides additional insights.  Table 8 provides an overview of which projects required external 
funding, used refinancing to defer aspects of their debt service, saw a significant downgrade to 
their bond rating defaulted on their debt, or were sold to other entities at a loss. 
Table 8:   
Internal details of project performance 
Project 




Refinance deferrals Bond 
rating 
downgrade 








Jackson, TN  X  X X X   
Provo, UT X X    X  X 
Windom, MN  X   X    
UTOPIA, UT X  X  X    
Burlington, VT X X  X  X X X 
Morristown, TN  X X X X X   
Pulaski, TN   X      
Clarksville, TN  X       
Wilson, NC  X       
Lafayette, LA  X       
Tullahoma, TN   X      
Chattanooga, TN  X       
Monticello, MN X X     X  
Salisbury, NC X X  X  X   




 Despite the fact that all fifteen projects were supposed to be self-sustaining, fourteen 
projects (93%) received additional funds from outside sources, with the sole exceptions being 
Tullahoma and Pulaski.  This additional funding took on different forms, with some cities relying 
on more than one source.  Six projects (40%) received contributions supported by tax dollars 
(Burlington, Dunnellon, Monticello, Provo, Salisbury, and UTOPIA).  Eleven projects (69%) 
received interfund loans from other municipal units.  Many projects borrowed significant 
amounts, with the peak of these loans averaging 37% of the initial debt financing.  
 Ten projects (67%) declined to back their debt with the cities’ taxing power and full faith 
and credit.  Of these, three projects (20%) nonetheless provided support for the municipal fiber 
projects out of their general funds despite the specific language in the debt instrument protecting 
these cities from having to do so (Burlington, Monticello, and Salisbury). 
 Five projects (33%) used refinancing to mitigate their debt obligations.  Four projects 
(27%) deferred the date when repayment of principal was to begin (Burlington, Jackson, 
Morristown, Salisbury).  Four projects (27%) extended the maturity date of the debt (Jackson, 
Morristown, UTOPIA, and Windom).   
 Five projects (33%) saw significant downgrades to their bond ratings, although one has 
since recovered (Burlington).  Three projects (20%) have defaulted on their debt (Burlington, 
Dunnellon, and Monticello).  Of these, two projects (13%) stopped servicing their debt just 
before principal repayments were supposed to begin (Burlington and Monticello).  The 
remaining project (7%) made the necessary payments until it disposed of the project during its 
fourth year of operations, when it settled its debt for less than its full value (Dunnellon).  Three 
projects (20%) sold their operations at significant losses (Burlington, Dunnellon, and Provo). 
 
27 
6 Analyzing the determinants of viability 
 The wide variability in outcomes invites further inquiry into what factors drive success 
and failure.  One approach to determining why municipal fiber projects succeed or fail is to 
compare a project’s financial forecast with its actual performance.  Three municipal fiber 
projects included pro forma projections of their financial performance as appendices to their 
official bond statements:  Lafayette, Monticello, and Windom.  A summary comparison of the 
projected versus actual financial performance for these three projects appears in Table 9.  Full 
details are available in Online Appendix B. 
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Table 9:   
Projected versus actual performance for Lafayette, Monticello, and Windom 
  Lafayette Monticello Windom 
  2007–2016 2008–2015 2004–2011 
Customers 
in the final 
year of the 
forecast 
period* 
Projected 29,555 2,543 1,188 
Actual 17,686 1,487 1,073 
Difference -11,869 -1,056 -115 
Pct. difference -40% -42% -10% 
Operating 
revenue 
Projected 367,113,147  37,699,878  12,814,000  
Actual 186,314,498  10,567,972  11,329,437  
Difference (180,798,649) (27,131,906) (1,484,563) 





Projected 12,421 14,825 10,786 
Actual 10,535 7,107 10,559 
Difference -1,887 -7,718 -228 
Pct. difference -15% -52% -2% 
Operating 
expense 
Projected (207,828,869) (33,114,151) (11,300,991) 
Actual (94,216,489) (19,471,147) (14,606,820) 
Difference 113,612,380  13,643,004  (3,305,829) 





Projected -57% -88% -88% 
Actual -51% -184% -129% 
Difference 6% -96% -41% 
Pct. difference 11% -110% -46% 
Operating 
income 
Projected 159,284,278  4,585,727  1,177,349  
Actual (32,509,994) (8,903,175) (3,277,383) 
Difference (191,794,272) (13,488,902) (4,454,732) 
Pct. difference -120% -294% -378% 
Additions 
to plant 
Projected (97,907,643) (20,356,614) (8,376,101) 
Actual (127,387,523) (15,178,684) (9,481,853) 
Difference (29,479,880) 5,177,930  (1,105,752) 
Pct. difference +30% -25% +13% 
CFO 
Projected 155,182,418  3,999,509  666,910  
Actual 28,011,729  (7,095,414) 1,384,598  
Difference (127,170,689) (11,094,923) 717,688  
Pct. difference -82% -277% +108% 
Debt 
service 
Projected (62,777,862) (12,331,000) (4,609,570) 
Actual (53,849,276) (13,766,869) (4,607,735) 
Difference 8,928,586  (1,435,869) 1,835  
Pct. difference -14% +12% +0% 
* Includes only data customers for Monticello and Windom; includes  




 Of these three projects, Windom is the only project to exceed its CFO expectations, with 
such expectations exceeded by +$0.7 million.  Contrast this with Lafayette’s ($127.2 million) 
and Monticello’s ($11.1 million) CFO shortfall. 
 The primary driver of Windom’s positive results appears to be its relative success in 
acquiring customers.  Its customer total in 2011 fell only -10% short of projections, which was 
much smaller than Lafayette’s -40% or Monticello’s -42% shortfall.  As a result, Windom’s 
revenue fell short of projections by only -12%, compared to -49% for Lafayette and -72% for 
Monticello.  This shortfall clearly resulted from the number of customers, rather than the amount 
of revenue generated from each customer, as Windom and Lafayette generated similar ARPU of 
roughly +$10,500, with Monticello only slightly behind. 
 Operating efficiency appears to have played a less significant a role.  The ratio of 
Windom’s operating expenses to operating revenue underperformed expectations by -46%.  
Similarly, Monticello’s operating efficiency was -110% versus expectations.  This did not 
prevent either Windom or Monticello from outperforming Lafayette in terms of CFO, despite 
Lafayette’s +11% improvement in operating efficiency as compared to expectations. 
 The role of capital expenses is similarly unclear.  The fact that Windom’s additions to 
plant exceeded projections by +13% did not prevent it from meeting expectations in terms of 
CFO.  Conversely, Monticello’s -25% lower expenditures on additions to plant compared with 
projections did not lift its performance above Windom’s.  Interestingly, Lafayette’s forecast 
allocated no funding to “Additions to plant” after the fourth year of the project.  This ignores the 
need to invest capital to attach new customers to the network and to expand and upgrade the 
transmission equipment and other attached electronics needed to run the network, all of which 




 To date, debates over municipal fiber have been long on rhetoric and short on systematic 
empirical assessment of financial performance.  This analysis fills that void and provides cities 
weighing whether to initiate a municipal fiber project with hard data based on the actual 
performance of existing municipal fiber projects to inform their decisions whether to proceed.   
 An examination of the actual performance of the fifteen projects for which complete data 
since 2011 are available reveals that none of them satisfied the standard test of short-run 
financial viability, which required them to receive with infusions of additional cash from outside 
sources or obtain some form of debt relief.  In terms of long-run viability, again measured by 
actual performance, thirteen projects (87%) generated insufficient ANCF to put them on track to 
repay their debt by the date their initial debt is scheduled to mature.  Moreover, eleven projects 
(73%) have either already defaulted or generated negative cumulative ANCF over the past three 
fiscal years, which leaves them poorly positioned unless they substantially improve their 
operations.  An assessment of theoretical, best-case performance based on the NPV of CFO 
reveals that, even if these projects had achieved optimal performance for capital expenditures 
and debt service, the majority of the projects (53%) generated insufficient discounted CFO to 
cover their project costs. 
 Closer analysis of the projects in our study reveals further problems.  Although all fifteen 
were expected to be self-sustaining, thirteen (87%) received further infusions of cash.  Six of the 
projects (40%) received such infusions from general revenue even though three of those (20%) 
declined to back their initial debt with their general taxing power.  Five projects (33%) used 
refinancing to defer the due date of principal repayment or to extend the maturity date of the 
debt.  Five projects (33%) saw significant downgrades to their bond ratings.  Three projects 
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(20%) have defaulted on their debt.  Three projects (20%) have already been liquidated at 
significant losses. 
 An analysis of the reasons for success and failure suggests that the ability to generate 
revenue played the most significant role.  Efficiency in capital costs and operating efficiency 
appear to have exerted influence over the overall results.   
 These results suggest that decisionmakers should carefully assess the possibility that a 
municipal fiber network might struggle and include the costs associated with dealing with that 
outcome when deciding whether to initiate such a project.  At a minimum, due diligence would 
seem to require an analysis of whether the current project more closely resembles projects that 
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